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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHARLIE BROWN CONSTRUCTION CO.,
INC., a Nevada Corporation,
CHARLIE BROWN and CARMA BROWN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

:
:
:

Case No.

:

LEISURE SPORTS INCORPORATED, a
Nevada Corporation, WEST VILLAGE
UNIT NO. ONE, MT. HOLLY RECREATION
community, CONRAD H. KONING, and
AMY J. KONING,

:
:

Category 13

:

Defendants-Respondents. :
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Defendants-Respondents, petition this Court, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-4 (1987) and R. Utah S. Ct. 42 et. seq. , to deny
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Are there special and important reasons for this Court to

review a 3-0 decision by the Court of Appeals upholding a Trial
Court's dismissal of an action on the grounds of delay, v/here the
Appellate Court's analysis is based on a thorough review of the
factual circumstances surrounding the dismissal, and its holding is
based on prior decisions of this Court?
2.

Did

the Court of Appeals

err

in

failing

to

consider

Appellants1 argument that the Trial Court was required to consider
whether less drastic sanctions than dismissal would be appropriate,

where that argument was not raised in the Trial Court, nor in
Appellants' brief, but was first raised during oral arguments before
the Appellate Court?
OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is reported
at 740 P. 2d. 1368 (Utah App. 1987) and at 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 25.

A

copy of the slip opinion issued by the Court of Appeals is attached
hereto as Appendix A.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The decision of the Court of Appeals was filed on August 17,
1987.

On September 14, 1987, Appellants sought and obtained an

extension of time to file the within Petition to September 30, 1987.
On or about October 30, 1987, Respondents sought and obtained an
extension

of time

to

November 30, 1987.

file

the within

Brief

in

Opposition, to

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. §78-2a-4 (1987) , and this Brief in Opposition was timely
filed pursuant to R. Utah S. Ct. 47.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature

of

the Case.

This

is an

action

for

specific

performance of the Defendants' obligation to pave certain roads in a
subdivision, and for damages, attorney's fees and other relief as
authorized by contract and by applicable statutes.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition

Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed on June 15, 1981.

in Lower Courts.
The Trial Court

purported to dismiss ttie case, sua sponte, by Minute Entry entered
on June 18, 1987.

A copy of the Minute Entry was mailed to counsel

for both parties.

No order was prepared or signed by the Court.

Defendants' attorney filed a Notice of Withdrawal on or about June
25, 1984.
on

More than eight months elapsed before Plaintiffs filed,

February

25,

1985,

a

motion

to

set

aside

the

dismissal.

Secretarial error was asserted by Plaintiffs' counsel for the delay
after receipt of the Minute Entry.
Court on March 18, 1985.

The matter was heard by the

At a hearing on March 18, 1985, the Court

reviewed the entire file and considered arguments of counsel.
Court

noting

Plaintiffs'

failure

to

diligently

prosecute

The
their

lawsuit, affinned the dismissal and entered orders accordingly.
Plaintiffs perfected an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.

The

case was transferred by the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals.
After oral arguments, the Court of Appeals, by a 3-0 decision,
affirmed the dismissal.
C.

Statement of Facts.

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint on June

15, 1981, to compel completion of certain road improvements.
Defendants1

request, Plaintiffs posted

a non-resident

pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (j).

At

cost bond

Defendants then

filed their Answer on July 6, 1981.
Approximately ten and one-half months later, on May 27, 1982,
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend their Complaint and a notice to
take Defendants, Conrad and Amy Koning's depositions (R. 15-16).

At

Defendants1 request, the depositions were postponed to July 9, 1982
(R. 17). On June 14, a hearing was held on Plaintiffs' Motion to
Amend their Complaint.

Plaintiffs1 failed to appear and the Motion

was denied subject to renewal at a later date (R. 19) .

Plaintiffs

never renewed the Motion.

On June 21, 1982, John E. Maycock filed

an appearance as Defendants1 co-counsel.

Subsequently, Defendants'

original counsel, Scott J. Thorley, withdrew (R. 20).
On

July

Protective

9,

Orders

Defendants' based

and

16,

1982,

requesting

Defendants

their

their Motions

filed

depositions

on Protective

concurrent Federal litigation (R. 23-27) .

Motions

not

Orders

be

for

taken.

issued

in

The Court never ruled on

the Motions, nor did Plaintiffs pursue their requested depositions.
On April 4, 1983, some nine months after Defendants' Motions for
Protective Orders, Plaintiffs filed Interrogatories with the Court.
Plaintiffs1 counsel mistakenly mailed a set of the Interrogatories
to Thorley, Defendants' former counsel.

The Interrogatories were

not mailed to Maycock, and Plaintiffs' counsel blamed this oversight
on

his

secretary

withdrawn

(Tr. page

3,

lines

20-22).

from the case, never forwarded

Thorley,

having

the Interrogatories to

Maycock.
After eight more months of inactivity, on December 5, 1983, the
Court sua sponte filed an Order to Show Cause why the case should
not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
parties to appear on March 19, 1984.

The Court ordered the

The Court also filed a Notice

for a pretrial hearing, also set for March 19, 1984.
realized

the error with the Interrogatories

and entered

Stipulation with Defendants allowing Defendants
respond.

The Stipulation also gratuitously

Plaintiffs
into a

30 more days to

stated, "This matter

should be stricken from the Court's pretrial calendar until the

parties

have

completed

their

discovery

or

until

either

party

requests a pretrial conference." (R. 44).
On

the

telephoned

morning
the

Stipulation.

Trial

of

March

Court

19,

Judge

1984,
and

Plaintiffs'

informed

him

counsel
of

the

A Minute Entry was filed noting that a continuance had

been granted until April 16, and that neither party had appeared at
the hearing (R. 42). On April 16, 1984, the Court again continued
the matter for 60 days (R. 42). On April 30, 1984, the Trial Court
sua sponte mailed notices to the parties setting trial for June 18,
1984

(R.

45).

Plaintiffs'

counsel

contacted

the

Trial

Court

Executive and explained the Stipulation (Tr. page 6, lines 10-12).
Rather

than vacating

the

date, the

Trial Court

Executive

sent

revised notices changing the trial setting to a pretrial hearing (R.
46) .
On June 15, 1984, Plaintiffs' counsel personally spoke to the
Trial Court Judge and discussed

the Stipulation and a possible

settlement between the parties (Tr. page 6, lines 15-29).

The Court

allegedly excused the parties from appearing at the June 18 hearing
(Tr. page 7, lines 1-4) .

However, when the matter was called on

June 18, and neither party was present, the Judge ordered the case
dismissed.

In a Minute Entry the Court stated:

This matter was called on hearing for a pretrial
conference. No one appeared on behalf of either party.
This matter had been set several times for pretrial and
no one had ever appeared. The Court ordered the matter
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. The Minute
Entry will serve as the Order of Dismissal. A copy is to
be mailed to the respective parties. (R. 48)

Copies of the Minute Entry were mailed to both parties on June
28, 1984 (R. 49).
Due to error, allegedly on the part of Plaintiffs1 counsel's
secretary, the Minute Entry did not come to Plaintiffs' counsel's
attention until seven months later in January, 1985
lines

13-24) .

During

Notice of Withdrawal

this

seven-month

(Tr. page 7,

period, Maycock

filed a

(R. 50) and Defendants Koning, partially in

reliance on the Minute Entry, sold their shares in co-defendant
Leisure Sports, Inc. (R. 58). After becoming aware of the Minute
Entry, on February 24, 1985, Plaintiffs' counsel filed a Motion to
set aside the dismissal (R. 52-56).
At a hearing on March 18, 1985, the Court reviewed the entire
file, took evidence and heard arguments of counsel.

The Court

reviewed Plaintiffs' ten and one-half months delay after Defendants
filed their Answer and Plaintiffs' failure to attend the hearing on
their

Motion

to

Amend

their

Complaint.

The

Court

reviewed

Plaintiffs' failure to pursue a ruling on Defendants' Motion for
Protective

Orders against the requested

depositions.

The Court

reviewed another ten-month delay before Plaintiffs pursued another
discovery

devise,

namely

the

Interrogatories.

The

Court

also

reviewed eight months more of delay before Plaintiffs discovered
Defendants did not have the Interrogatories.

Finally, and as noted

by the Court in its Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside
the Dismissal, the Court reviewed yet another eight months delay by
Plaintiffs

from

the time notification

received until they

of

the Minute

Entry

was

filed a Motion to Set Aside the Dismissal.

Charlie Brown Construction Co., Inc. vs. Leisure Sports Inc. 740
P.2d 1368, 1370-1371 ( Utah App. 1987).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT REASONS EXIST FOR THIS COURT
TO REVIEW THE UNANIMOUS DECISION OF A THREE JUDGE APPEALS
COURT PANEL WHICH UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL
OF AN ACTION ON THE GROUNDS OF DELAY
Review
R.Utah

by

S. Ct.

Certiorari,

Writ
43

of

sets

Certiorari
forth

is

not

a

considerations

matter

governing

of

right.

review

of

Rule 43 states:

Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and
important
reasons
therefor.
The following, while neither controlling nor
wholly measuring the court's descretion, indicate the
character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered
a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of
the Court of Appeals on the same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided
a question of state or federal law in a way that is in
conflict with a decision of this court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered
a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state or federal law
which has not been, but should be, settled by this court.
This panel of the Court of Appeals has not rendered a decision
in

conflict with

the decision

of another panel of the Court

Appeals on the same issue of law.

of

As discussed below, the holding

of the Court of Appeals in the instant case is note in conflict with
a

decision

of

this

court, nor

has

it

so

far departed

from

the

accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an

exercise

of

this

court's

power

of

supervision.

No

important

question of municipal, state, or federal law has been settled by the
appellate court's decision in this matter.

Therefore, it would be a

wasteful use of this court's time to grant the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari in this case.
A

*

UTAH LAW IS WELL SETTLED WHERE DELAY IS THE GROUNDS FOR

DISMISSING A LAWSUIT.
Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within the
broad

discretion

of

the

trial

court.

Grundmann v. Williams &

Peterson, 685 P.2d 538 (Utah 1984); Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765
(Utah 1980); Department of Soc. Serv. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323 (Utah
1980).

This court has stated that it "will not interfere with that

decision unless it clearly appears that the court has abused its
discretion and that there is a likelihood that injustice has been
wrought.
1324.
276

Department of Soc. Serv. v. Romero, supra, 609 P. 2d at

See also, Reliance National Life Ins. Co. v. Cain, 555 P.2d
(Utah 1976)

admissible

(If that discretion has substance in believable,

evidence,

though

controversial

in

nature,

appellate

review calls for affirmance.)
Because of the discretionary power granted to the trial judge,
each case must be decided based on the totality of its own unique
facts and circumstances; included therein is the conduct of both
parties and the opportunity each has had to move the case forward if
they so desire, and also what, if any, difficulty or prejudice may
have

been

caused

important, whether

to

the

other

it appears

party

that

any

by

the

delay,

injustice

has

and

most

resulted.

Department of Soc. Serv. v. Romero, supra, 609 P.2d at 1324.

Because of the unique factual circumstances inherent in every
case, there has developed a large body of Utah law where this court
has used the above criteria to review a trial court's dismissal of
an action due to delay.

On appeal each case is separately analyzed

on its own unique facts and circumstances. See eg. Grundmann v.
Williams
McLean,

& Peterson, 685 P.2d
656

P.2d

986

(Utah

538

(Utah 1984); K.L.C. Inc. v.

1982);

Wilson

v.

Lambert,

supra;

Department of Soc. Serv. v. Romero, supra; Utah Oil Co, v. Harris,
565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977); Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977);
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977); Maxfieid v.
Fishier, 538 P.*2d 1323 (Utah 1975); Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v.
Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975); Crystal
Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959).
B.

THE APPELLATE COURT'S HOLDING IN THIS CASE IS CONSISTENT

WITH CASE LAW AS SET FORTH BY THIS COURT,
The instant case is reported at 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1987).

The

Appellate Court's opinion begins with an exhaustive recitation of
the facts.

740 P.2d at 1369-1371.

The most important fact in this case is that on March 18, 1985,
the trial court held a hearing on Plaintiff's motion to set aside
the dismissal.
considered

At that time, the court reviewed the entire file and

arguments

of

counsel.

Referring

to

that

fact, the

Appellate Court stated as follows:
At the March 18 hearing on plaintiffs' motion to set aside
the dismissal, the court reviewed the entire file. The
court reviewed plaintiffs' ten and one-half months delay
after defendants filed their answer and plaintiffs'
failure to attend the hearing on their motion to amend

their complaint. The court reviewed plaintiffs1 failure
to pursue a ruling on defendants1 motion for protective
orders against the requested depositions.
The court
reviewed another ten month delay before plaintiffs pursued
another discovery device, namely the interrogatories. The
court also reviewed eight months" more of delay before
plaintiffs discovered defendants did not have the
interrogatories. Finally/ and as noted by the court in
its order denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the
dismissal, the court reviewed yet another eight months
delay by plaintiffs from the time notification of the
minute entry was received until they filed a motion to set
aside the dismissal. 740 P.2d at 1370-1371.
Based on these facts, the Appellate Court found that the case
to be in line with Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1978),
where this court affirmed the trial court's dismissal with prejudice
against

the plaintiff

for

"inexcuseable

neglect

and

failing to

prepare and prosecute her claim with reasonable diligence."
538 P.2d at 1324-25.

Supra,

The Appellate Court summed up its analysis by

stating as follows:
In the instant case, the trial court provided plaintiffs
"an opportunity to be heard and do justice." Westinghouse
Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544
P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975).
Plaintiffs nevertheless abused their opportunity through
dilatory conduct.
We therefore find no abus£ of discretion and affirm the
trial court's order denying plaintiff's motion to set
aside the dismissal. 740 P.2d at 1371.
Under the standards set forth by this Court, the Appellate
panel

found

substantial

believable

and

admissible

evidence

to

support the trial court's discretion in dismissing the lawsuit for
delay.

It would be a waste of this court's time to once again

review the circumstances surrounding the dismissal.

POINT II
MATTERS NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT ARE
NOT TO BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL,
Point II of Appellate's Petition deals with whether the Court
of Appeals should have considered lesser sanctions than a dismissal
on the merits.
follows:
Appeals

Page 16, Lines 2-5 of Appellant's Petition states as

"Plaintiffs
at

oral

raised

this argument before

argument, but

the

court

the Court of

apparently

failed

to

consider the argument."
This court has "consistently held that matters not raised in
the trial court will not be considered by this court on appeal."
Department of Soc. Serv. v. Romero, supra, 609 P.2d at 3324.

In

this case, Plaintiffs did not raise the matter as an issue at any
time in the lower court proceedings.

Neither was the issue raised

in plaintiffs1 appeal brief to the Court of Appeals.

The first time

the argument appears is, as plaintiffs state in their Petition, at
oral arguments before the Court of Appeals.
In addition, this court has never required trial courts to
consider whether anything less than dismissal on the merits would be
appropriate in cases dismissed for delay.
Therefore,

this

court

should

not

consider

Point

II

of

appellant's petition.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs are required "to prosecute their claims uith aue
diligence, or accept the penalty of dismissal." Maxfield v. Fishier,
supra,

538 P. 2d at 1325.

In the instant case, the Appellate Court

carefully reviewed the circumstances surrounding the dismissal for

delay.

It properly applied existing case law propounded by this

Court to the unique facts in this case.

It found that the trial

court provided plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard and to do
justice,

but

that

plaintiffs

abused

theiir

opportunity

through

Hi2atery conduct.
Inasmuch a s the Appellate Court reviewed this case under the
accepted standards set forth by this court, there are no special or
important reasons for this court to review this matter.

Indeed, it

would be a wasteful repetition to do so.
WHEREFORE, this court should deny appellant's Petition for Writ
of Certiorari pursuant to R. Utah S. Ct 48(c).
DATED this 28th day of November, 1987.

l&tfSSell 0. Gallian and
\Jeffrey^C. Wilcox
Galiian'' & Westfall
Attorneys for Defendants/
Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing document, postage pre-paid on this 30th day of

November,

1987, to the

fallawiaa:
Jackson Howard and
Leslie W. Slaugh
Howard, Lewis & Peterson
Attorneys for Appellants
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
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APPENDIX "A"

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Charlie Brown Construction
Co.# Inc./ a Nevada Corporation,
Charlie Brown and Carma Brown#
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Leisure Sports Incorporated/
a Nevada/Corporation,
West Village Unit No. One,
Mt. Holly Recreation Community/
Conrad H. Koning, and Amy J. Koning#
Defendants and Respondents.
Before Judges Jackson, Bench and Orme.

OPINION
(For Publication)

Case No. 860119-CA

FILED
AUG 171987
Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court

BENCH, Judge:

Utah Court of Apccais

Plaintiffs appeal an order of the district court denying
their motion to set aside the dismissal of their complaint. We
affirm.
Plaintiffs are the purchasers and owners of certain lots
at Mount Holly Ski Resort. Defendants are the developers of
the area. On June 15, 1981, plaintiffs filed a complaint
against defendants to compel completion of certain road
improvements. At defendants' request, plaintiffs posted a
non-resident cost bond pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(j).
Defendants then filed their answer on July 6, 1981.
Ten and one-half months later, en May 2 * t XT 2r>Qr\4*n,
plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint and a notice
to take defendants Conrad and Amy Koning's depositions. At
defendants* request, the depositions were postponed to July 9,
1982. On June 14, a hearing was held on plaintiffs1 motion to
amend their complaint. Plaintiffs failed to appear and the
motion was denied subject to renewal at a later date. On June
21, 1982, John B. Maycock filed an appearance as defendants1
co-counsel. Subsequently, defendants' original counsel, Scott
J. Thorley, withdrew.

On July 9 and 16, 1982, defendants filed motions for
protective orders requesting their depositions not be taken.
Defendants based their motions on protective.orders issued in
concurrent federal*litigation. The court never ruled on the
motions, nor did plaintiffs pursue their requested
depositions* Plaintiffs filed interrogatories with the court
on April 4, 1983, nine months after defendants1 motions for
protective orders. Plaintiffs* counsel mistakenly mailed a set
of the interrogatories to Thorley, defendants' former counsel,
who never forwarded the interrogatories to Maycock.
On December 5, 1983, after eight more months of
inactivity, the court sua sponte filed an order to show cause
why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
The court ordered both parties to appear on March 19, 1984.
Failure to appear "[would] be considered as acquiescence to
entry of an order of dismissal and the judgment [would] be
entered by the Court without further notice to the parties."
The court also filed a notice for a pre-trial hearing, also set
for March 19, 1984. Plaintiffs realized the error with the
interrogatories and entered into a stipulation with defendants
allowing defendants thirty more days to respond. The
stipulation also gratuitously stated, "this matter should be
stricken from the Court's Pre-Trial Calendar until the parties
have completed their discovery or until either party requests a
Pre-Trial Conference."
The morning of March 19, plaintiffs' counsel telephoned
the trial court judge and informed him of the stipulation. The
trial court excused the parties' absence and in a second order
to show cause continued the pre-trial to April 16, 1984. A
transmittal letter, which referred to the telephone
conversation and the stipulation, was filed on March 22. On
April 16, 1984, the court again continued the matter for sixty
days. A signed stipulation was filed on April 19, 1984. On
April 30, 1984, the trial court sua sponte mailed notices to
the parties setting trial for June 18, 1984. Plaintiffs
contacted the trial court executive and explained the
stipulation. The trial court executive, rather than vacating
the date, sent revised notices changing the trial setting to a
pre-trial hearing.
On June 15, 1984, plaintiffs' counsel personally spoke to
the trial court judge in St, George. Counsel explained the
stipulation and informed the judge a settlement was likely.
The court allegedly excused the parties from appearing at the
June 18 hearing. However, when the matter was called on June
18 and neither party was present, the judge ordered the case
dismissed. In a minute entry, the court stated:
This matter was called on hearing for a
Pre-Trial Conference. No one appeared on
behalf of either party. This matter had
been set several times for pre-trial and
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no one had ever appeared. The Court
ordered the matter dismissed with
prejudice and on the merits. The minute
entry will serve as the Order of
Dismissal. A copy is to be mailed to the
respective parties.
The court clerk mailed copies of the unsigned minute entry to
both parties on June 28.
Due to error, allegedly on the part of plaintiffs'
counsel's secretary, the minute entry did not come to
plaintiffs' counsel's attention until seven months later in
January, 1985. ^ When plaintiffs' counsel became aware of the
minute entry, he attempted to consult with the trial court and
defendants. Unable to do so, he filed a motion on February 25
to set aside the dismissal. At a hearing on March 18, 1985,
t&e court reviewed the entire file and considered arguments of
counsel.2 The court, noting plaintiffs' failure diligently
to prosecute their lawsuit, affirmed the dismissal and entered
orders accordingly.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in
denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal.
Plaintiffs argue under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) the court has no
authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute absent a motion
by defendants. The rule states, "For failure of the plaintiff
to prosecute or comply with these rules or any order of court,
a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim
against him." The language in Rule 41(b) merely permits, not
requires, a motion by defendant. The Utah Supreme Court, in
Brasher Motor and Finance Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461
P.2d 464, 464-65 (1969), states, "In dismissing an action for
want of prosecution, the court may proceed under [Rule 41(b)],
or it may, of its own motion, take action to that end." See
also Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980). Under
the comparable federal rule, the United States Supreme Court
similarly held:
1. During this seven month period, Maycock filed a notice of
withdrawal and defendants Konings, in reliance on the minute
entry, sold their shares in co-defendant Leisure Sports, Inc.
2. Defendants opposed plaintiffs' motion, arguing their counsel
never had been authorized to enter into any stipulation to delay
the action. The claim is of questionable relevance and is not a
factor in our decision.
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Neither the permissive language of the
Rule—which merely authorizes a mo_tion by
the defendant—nor its policy requires us
to conclude that it was the purpose of the
Rule to abrogate the power of courts,
acting on their own initiative/ to clear
their calendars of cases that have
remained dormant because of the inaction
or dilatoriness of the parties seeking
relief. The authority of a court to
dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution
has generally been considered an "inherent
power," governed not by rule or statute
but by the control necessarily vested in
courts to manage their own affairs so as
to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases*
Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 630-31 (1962).
As stated in Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity Mutual
Irrigation Co., 698 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo. 1985), "The burden
is upon the plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course without
unusual or unreasonable delay." Plaintiffs are required "to
prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept the
penalty of dismissal." Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323,
1325 (Utah 1975). Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a
decision within the broad discretion of the trial court. This
Court will not interfere with that decision unless it clearly
appears that the court has abused its discretion and that there
is a likelihood an injustice has been wrought. Department of
Soc. Serv. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980).
At the March 18 hearing on plaintiffs' motion to set aside
the dismissal, the court reviewed the entire file. The court
reviewed plaintiffs* ten and one-half months delay after
defendants filed their answer and plaintiffs* failure to attend
the hearing on their motion to amend their complaint. The
court reviewed plaintiffs4 failure to pursue a ruling on
defendants* motion for protective orders against the requested
depositions. The court reviewed another ten month delay before
plaintiffs pursued another discovery device, namely the
interrogatories. The court also reviewed eight months more of
delay before plaintiffs discovered defendants did not have the
interrogatories. Finally, and as noted by the court in its
order denying plaintiffs* motion to set aside the dismissal,
the court reviewed yet another eight months delay by plaintiffs
from the time notification of the minute entry was received
until they filed a motion to set aside the dismissal.
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Plaintiffs argue the court erred in dismissing their action
in light of the court's alleged "excusa1 of'both parties*
appearance at the June 18 hearing. Plaintiffs contend the
trial court was bound by the parties* prior stipulation to
postpone any pre-trial conference which was communicated to and
filed with the court. However, a trial court is not
necessarily bound by a mere stipulation between parties which
has not been incorporated in an order where the stipulation
attempts to wrest from the court control of its own calendar.

Saa taKe ffmflith* 698 p.2d at 1346.
Regardless of whether the trial court never knew of,
ignored, or simply forgot about the stipulation, plaintiffs
themselves failed to comply with the intent of the
stipulation. The primary purpose of the stipulation was to
provide defendants an additional thirty days to respond to the
interrogatories. When the thirty day period expired and no
response had been received, plaintiffs did not move under Utah
R. Civ* P. 37 for an order compelling discovery nor attempt in
any way to move the case forward.
Plaintiffs do not claim the stipulation as an excuse for
any of their numerous delays. Rather, plaintiffs* counsel
asserts secretarial error as an excuse for the delay after
receipt of the minute entry. Generally, law office delays or
failures are unacceptable excuses for failure to prosecute.
Valente v. First Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, 528 P.2d 699,
700 (Nev. 1974).
Plaintiffs last argue the trial court erred in dismissing
their action with prejudice and on the merits. Rule 41(b)
states, "Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal
not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an
indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the
merits.** Plaintiffs cite three Utah Supreme Court cases which
reversed a trial court's dismissal with prejudice as an abuse
of discretion. Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah
1977) (motion to dismiss filed at the same time as defendant's
answer); Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977)
(delay due to settlement negotiations); Crystal Lime & Cement
Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959) (failure to
consider counterclaims). These three cases are readily
distinguishable. The facts of this case are much closer to
those of Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975). In
Maxfield. the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's
dismissal with prejudice against the plaintiff for "inexcusable
neglect in failing to prepare and prosecute her claim with
reasonable diligence.- I&. at 1324-25. In the instant case,
the trial court provided plaintiffs "an opportunity to be heard
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and to do justice." Westinohouse Eler. Supply Co. v. Paul W.
Larsen Cnntractor. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975).
Plaintiffs nevertheless abused their opportunity through
dilatory conduct.
We therefore find no abuse of discretion and affirm the
trial court's order denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the
dismissal. Costs to defendants.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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